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Abstract
BitLocker is a full-disk encryption feature available in recent Windows versions.
It is designed to protect data by providing encryption for entire volumes and
it makes use of a number of different authentication methods. In this paper
we present a solution, named BitCracker, to attempt the decryption, by means
of a dictionary attack, of memory units encrypted by BitLocker with a user
supplied password or the recovery password. To that purpose, we resort to
GPU (Graphics Processing Units) that are, by now, widely used as general-
purpose coprocessors in high performance computing applications. BitLocker
decryption process requires the computation of a very large number of SHA-
256 hashes and also AES, so we propose a very fast solution, highly tuned for
Nvidia GPU, for both of them. We analyze the performance of our CUDA
implementation on several Nvidia GPUs and we carry out a comparison of our
SHA-256 hash with the Hashcat password cracker tool. Finally, we present our
OpenCL version, recently released as a plugin of the John The Ripper tool.
Keywords: BitLocker, hash, SHA-256, AES, GPU, CUDA, cryptographic
attack, password cracking
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1. Introduction
BitLocker is a data protection feature that integrates with the Windows op-
erating system and addresses the threats of data theft or exposure from lost,
stolen, or inappropriately decommissioned computers. It offers a number of dif-
ferent authentication methods, like Trusted Platform Module, Smart Key, Re-
covery Password, user supplied password. BitLocker features a pretty complex
proprietary architecture but it also leverages some well-known algorithms, like
SHA-256 and AES. It is possible, and relatively easy (to the purpose, commer-
cial tools are available [12]) to instantly decrypt disks and volumes protected
with BitLocker by using the decryption key extracted from the main mem-
ory (RAM). In addition, it is also possible to decrypt for offline analysis or
instantly mount BitLocker volumes by utilizing the escrow key (BitLocker Re-
covery Key) extracted from a users Microsoft Account or retrieved from Active
Directory.
If the decryption key can not be retrieved, the only alternative remains to
unlock password-protected disks by attacking the password. The same, above
mentioned, commercial tools offer this as an option but in a quite generic form
(i.e., without taking into account the specific features of BitLocker). Moreover,
according to some comments1, they may be also not fully reliable. The goal of
the present paper is to describe our approach to attack BitLocker password-
protected storage units. We carefully studied available information about Bit-
Locker architecture and directly inspected several types of units in order to
find out how to minimize the amount of work required to check a candidate
password. The platforms we use for the attack are based on Nvidia GPUs and
we carefully optimized the most computing intensive parts of the procedure
achieving a performance that is, at least, comparable with that provided by
well-know password crackers like Hashcat [7] for the evaluation of the SHA-256
digest function. However the main goal of our work is not providing an alter-
native to Hashcat as a general framework for dictionary attacks but to offer
the first open-source high performance tool to test the security of storage units
protected by BitLocker using the user password and recovery password authen-
tication methods. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes BitLocker and in particular the decryption procedure of the so-called
Volume Master Key; Section 3 describes our attack, that we name BitCracker,
to BitLocker focusing on the optimizations made to improve the performance of
the execution of the SHA-256 algorithm (that is the computational bottleneck
of the decryption procedure); Section 4 presents the performance (as number
of passwords that is possible to check per second) of BitCracker using different
variants of the CUDA 2 architecture showing that there is an improvement of
more than a factor 8 moving from the Kepler to the Volta architecture. Sec-
1https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2016/07/breaking-bitlocker-encryption-brute-forcing-the-
backdoor-part-ii/
2https://developer.nvidia.com/cuda-zone
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tion 5 presents our OpenCL 3 implementation comparing the password rate
with results in Section 4. Section 6 reports a comparison of the performance,
limited to the evaluation of the SHA-256 digest, of BitCracker with respect to
Hashcat. Finally Section 7 summarizes the results and provides indications for
future activities.
2. BitLocker
BitLocker (formerly BitLocker Drive Encryption) is a full-disk encryption
feature included in the Ultimate and Enterprise editions of Windows Vista and
Windows 7, the Pro and Enterprise editions of Windows 8 and Windows 8.1,
Windows Server 2008 and Windows 10. It is designed to protect data by pro-
viding encryption for entire volumes.
BitLocker can encrypt several types of memory units like internal hard disks
or external memory devices 4(flash memories, external hard disks, etc..) offer-
ing a number of different authentication methods, like Trusted Platform Mod-
ule, Smart Key, Recovery Key, password, etc.. In this paper we focus on two
different authentication modes: the user password mode, in which the user, to
encrypt or decrypt a memory device, must type a password (as represented in
Figure 1) and the recovery password mode, that is a 48-digit key generated by
BitLocker (regardless of the authentication method chosen by the user) when
encrypting a memory device5 . By means of the recovery password the user
can access an encrypted device in the event that she/he can’t unlock the de-
vice normally.
During the encryption procedure, each sector in the volume is encrypted
individually, with a part of the encryption key being derived from the sector
number itself. This means that two sectors containing identical unencrypted
data will result in different encrypted bytes being written to the disk, making
it much harder to attempt to discover keys by creating and encrypting known
data. BitLocker uses a complex hierarchy of keys to encrypt devices. The
sectors themselves are encrypted by using a key called the Full-Volume En-
cryption Key (FVEK). The FVEK is not used by or accessible to users and
it is, in turn, encrypted with a key called the Volume Master Key (VMK).
This level of abstraction gives some unique benefits, but it makes the process
a bit more difficult to understand. The FVEK is kept as a closely guarded
secret because, if it were compromised, all of the sectors would need to be re-
encrypted. Since that would be a time-consuming operation, it is much better
to avoid it. Instead, the system works with the VMK. The FVEK (encrypted
with the VMK) is stored on the disk itself, as part of the volume metadata
and it is never written to disk unencrypted. The VMK is also encrypted with
3https://www.khronos.org/opencl
4BitLocker To Go feature
5Microsoft Blog: Recover Password method: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows/device-security/bitlocker/bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan
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Figure 1: BitLocker encryption of an USB pendrive using the password authentication
method.
one or more (combination of) authentication mechanisms as above mentioned;
for instance, if the memory device has been encrypted with the user password
method, in the volume metadata there are two encrypted VMKs: the VMK U,
that is the VMK encrypted with the user password, and the VMK R, that is
the VMK encrypted with the recovery password. Both FVEK and VMK are
encrypted according to the Counter with CBM-MAC (CCM) mode of AES.
During the decryption procedure (Figure 2) BitLocker, depending on the
authentication method in use, starts to decrypt the VMK. Then, if it obtains
the right value for the VMK, it decrypts in turn the FVEK and then the entire
memory device.
The attack described in the present paper aims at decrypting the correct
VMK key which belongs to an encrypted memory unit through a dictionary
attack to the user password or to the recovery password. That is, if an attacker
is able to find the password to correctly decrypt the VMK key, she/he is able
to decrypt the entire memory unit with that password.
2.1. User Password VMK Decryption Procedure
To gain an insight about the workings of our attack, more information are
necessary about the VMK decryption procedure (Figure 3) when the authenti-
cation method is a user password (see also [4] [6] and [5]):
1. the user provides the password;
2. SHA-256 is executed twice on it;
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Figure 2: BitLocker encryption/decryption scheme
3. there is a loop of 0x100000 iterations, in which SHA-256 is applied to a
structure like:
typedef struct {
unsigned char updateHash[32]; //last SHA-256 hash calculated
unsigned char passwordHash[32]; //hash from step 2
unsigned char salt[16];
uint64_t hash_count; // number of hash in loop, incremented
// at the end of every iteration
} bitlockerMessage;
4. this loop produces an intermediate key, used with AES to encrypt the
Initialization Vector (IV) (derived from a nonce);
5. XOR between encrypted IV and encrypted Message Authentication Code
(MAC) to obtain the decrypted MAC;
6. XOR between encrypted IV and encrypted VMK to obtain the decrypted
VMK;
7. if the MAC, calculated on the decrypted VMK, is equal to the decrypted
MAC, the input password and the decrypted VMK are correct;
All the elements required by the decryption procedure (like VMK, MAC,
IV, etc..) can be found inside the encrypted volume. In fact during the encryp-
tion, BitLocker stores not only encrypted data but also metadata that provide
information about encryption type, keys position, OS version, file system ver-
sion and so on. Thanks to [5], [6], [4] and [2] we understood how to get all
of those information reading the BitLocker Drive Encryption (BDE) encrypted
format.
After an initial header, every BDE volume contains 3 (for backup purposes)
FVE (Full Volume Encryption) metadata blocks, each one composed by a block
header, a metadata header and an array of metadata entries.
In Figure 4 we report an example of FVE block belonging to a memory unit
encrypted with Windows 8.1, enumerating the most interesting parts:
1. The “-FVE-FS-” signature, which marks the beginning of an FVE block
2. The Windows version number
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Figure 3: VMK decryption procedure
3. The type and value of a VMK metadata entry
4. According to this value, the VMK has been encrypted using the user
password authentication method
5. The salt of the VMK
6. According to this value, the type of VMK encryption is AES-CCM
7. Nonce
8. Message Authentication Code
9. Finally, the VMK
Our attack executes the BitLocker decryption procedure with several per-
formance improvements:
• The code has been optimized for NVIDIA GPUs (using the CUDA envi-
ronment) (Section 3)
• We introduced a preprocessing step, before starting the main attack, to
store in memory useful information for the SHA-256 based main loop
(Section 3.3)
• We found a way to remove the final MAC computation and comparison
(Section 3.4).
2.2. Recovery Password VMK Decryption Procedure
As above mentioned, the recovery password is a kind of passe-partout for all
the authentication methods. According to [2], the recovery password is a 48-
digit number composed by eight groups of six digits; each group of six digits
must be divisible by eleven and must be less than 720896. Finally, the sixth
digit in each group is a checksum digit. For instance, a valid recovery password
is:
236808-089419-192665-495704-618299-073414-538373-542366
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Figure 4: FVE metadata block, BitLocker Windows 8.1
The number of all possible recovery password candidates is huge, thus build-
ing the entire dictionary would require too much storage.
The algorithm used by BitLocker to encrypt a device using the recovery
password is similar to the user password one with few differences during the
initial SHA-256 application.
Figure 5 extends the Figure 4; in the same FVE block (initial signature at
mark number 1) there are 2 encrypted VMKs: the first one (VMK U) is en-
crypted with the user password (mark number 2) and the second one (VMK R)
with the recovery password (mark number 3). The hardest part of the recovery
password attack is to find the VMK R in the FVE blocks: each authentica-
tion method (i.e. TPM, TPM+PIN, user password, smart card, etc..) has its
own FVE block format and each one stores the VMK R into a different index.
Currently, we are able to find VMK R in case of devices encrypted with user
password and smart card while TPM and TPM+PIN methods obfuscate the
interesting part of the FVE block. BitCracker performance in case of recovery
password attack is similar to the performance in case of user password; for this
reason, during the rest of this paper, we report only about the performance of
user password attacks.
3. BitCracker
Our software, named BitCracker, aims at finding (starting from a dictio-
nary) the key of a memory unit encrypted using the password authentication
method of BitLocker. To achieve that goal, BitCracker uses GPUs (Graphics
Processing Units 6) to execute the algorithm described in Section 3.5 according
6https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graphics Processing Unit
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Figure 5: FVE metadata block, BitLocker Windows 8.1, two Volume Master Keys
to the Single Program, Multiple Data (SPMD) paradigm: all threads execute
same instructions on different test passwords. In this Section we describe more
in details the behaviour of our algorithm and several optimizations we intro-
duced to enhance its performance.
3.1. SHA-256
As described in section 2.1, SHA-256 is widely used in the BitLocker de-
cryption scheme to obtain the intermediate key from the user password, so we
focused our work in the improvement of its performance on GPU. Algorithm 1
presents a brief pseudo-algorithm of SHA-256 standard (for a full description,
see [3]) that is necessary for a better understanding of the work we did. It is
apparent that:
• first 16 words of W depends on the original message;
• there are two loops, the first to compute the MN message blocks and the
second one to compute the 64 rounds of SHA-256;
• circular shift is widely used and aritmetic operations are only bitwise,
sum, and subtraction.
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Algorithm 1 SHA-256 standard algorithm
1: Define Ch(x,y,z) = (x ∧ y)⊕ (¬x ∧ z)
2: Define Maj(x,y,z) = (x ∧ y)⊕ (x ∧ z)⊕ (y ∧ z)
3: Define ROTRn(x) = (x >> n) ∨ (x << w − n) with 0 ≤ n < w,w = 32
4: Define SHRn(x) = (x >> n)
5: Define σ2560 = ROTR
7(x)⊕ROTR18(x)⊕ SHR3(x)
6: Define σ2561 = ROTR
17(x)⊕ROTR19(x)⊕ SHR10(x)
7: Define M it as the t-th 32-bit word belonging to the i-th 512-bit block of the
padded message
8: Define K[64] as an array of constants
9:
10: for i = 1 to N do
11: Prepare the message schedule Wt
Wt =
{
M it if 0 ≤ t ≤ 15
σ2561 (Wt−2) +Wt−7 + σ
256
0 (Wt−15) +Wt−16 if 16 ≤ t ≤ 63
12: Initialize the 8 working variables: a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h with the (i− 1)st hash value:
a = Hi−10 ; b = H
i−1
1 ; c = H
i−1
2 ; d = H
i−1
3 ;
e = Hi−14 ; f = H
i−1
5 ; g = H
i−1
6 ;h = H
i−1
7
13: for t = 0 to 63 do
14: T1 = h + [ROTR
6(e)⊕ROTR11(e)⊕ROTR25(e)]+Ch(e, f, g)+K256t +Wt
15: T2 = [ROTR
2(a)⊕ROTR13(a)⊕ROTR22(a)] +Maj(a, b, c)
16: h=g; g=f; f=e;
17: e=d + T1
18: d=c; c=b; b=a;
19: a=T1 + T2
20: end for
21: Compute the ith intermediate hash value Hi
Hi0 = a+H
i−1
0 ;H
i
1 = b+H
i−1
1 ;
Hi2 = c+H
i−1
2 ;H
i
3 = d+H
i−1
3 ;
Hi4 = e+H
i−1
4 ;H
i
5 = f +H
i−1
5 ;
Hi6 = g +H
i−1
6 ;H
i
7 = h+H
i−1
7 ;
22: end for
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3.2. CUDA optimizations
Our first implementation of the SHA-256 algorithm, was a plain C imple-
mentation quite similar to the algorithm described in Section 3.1:
Listing 1: SHA-256 C implementation
for(i=0; i<64; i++){
T1 = h + S1(e) + CH(e,f,g) + K[i] + W[i];
T2 = S0(a) + MAJ(a,b,c);
h = g; g = f;
f = e; e = d + T1;
d = c; c = b;
b = a; a = T1 + T2;
}
There are many assignments and loops with no GPU optimization. We ran
our first test on a NVIDIA GPU Tesla K80 for an initial performance evalua-
tion, reaching up to 80 passwords per second.
After that, inspired by Nayuki implementation 7, we wrote a code without
loops (only inline instructions), a lower number of operations, high throughput
arithmetic instructions (see Section 4), removing all the useless aritmethics like
index calculation ( w − n ) or assignments (d=c; c=b; ...).
All GPU threads follow the same execution flow in a single SHA-256 execution:
no shared memory is used and each thread works on its subset of passwords
stored in global memory; variables used during execution are stored (as much
as possible) in GPU registers and all operations are performed inline, i.e., there
are no loops (except for the loop of 0x100000 SHA-256) and very few arrays
index computations to limit local memory usage (more later). The type of
instructions used are: 32-bit integer add, 32-bit integer shift, 32-bit bitwise
AND, OR, XOR (see Section 4 for further details).
Listing 2: Final version of SHA-256
#define ROR6(x) (((x) << 26) | ((x) >> 6))
....
#define ROUND(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, k)
h += (ROR6(e) ^ ROR11(e) ^ ROR25(e)) + (g ^ (e & (f ^ g))) + k + W[i];
d += h;
h += (ROR2(a) ^ ROR13(a) ^ ROR22(a)) + ((a & (b | c)) | (b & c));
function Sha256SingleExec() {
calculateWwords(W, M);
....
ROUND(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0, K[0])
ROUND(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 1, K[1])
.....
ROUND(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 63, K[63])
...
updateHashValue();
}
7SHA-256 Nayuki implementation: http://nayuki.eigenstate.org/page/fast-sha2-hashes-
in-x86-assembly (Checked on May 20 2018)
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We reserve special attention to the usage of GPU local memory, because
it can dramatically decrease performance. Usually, if there is an array inside
a kernel code declared as a local variable but accessed dynamically inside the
code (i.e., array indexing is calculated at runtime) CUDA stores that array in
local memory (instead of using registers) and this penalizes the performance
since the local memory is actually a part of the (slow) global memory of the
GPU. We reduced local memory usage as much as possible (we double-checked
it by looking at the low-level PTX code) by replacing index calculations and
loops.
During a second round of tests using the same NVIDIA GPU Tesla K80,
we reached up to 103 passwords per second.
After that, we focused on the VMK decryption algorithm (Figure 3): in
Section 3.3 we describe our enhancement during the second SHA-256 in each
iteration of the main loop while in Section 3.4 we explain how the final com-
parison of the MAC can be easily removed.
3.3. First improvement: W Words
The most time-consuming part of the decryption algorithm is the loop of
0x100000 (1.048.576) SHA-256 operations, since a single hash involves many
arithmetic operations. Moreover, during each iteration, the SHA-256 algorithm
is applied twice to the 128 byte structure bitlockerMessage (Section 2.1) which
is composed by several fields as shown in Table 1.
64-byte block #1 64-byte block #2
32 bytes 32 bytes 16 bytes 8 bytes 32 bytes 8 bytes
updated hash password hash salt hash count padding message size
variable fixed
fixed for each
encrypted unit
between 0 and
0x100000 fixed fixed to 88
Table 1: BitLocker SHA-256 message
As mentioned above, the first 16 W words depend on the original message
and the others on the first 16 words. Therefore, looking at the message in
Figure 1 we were able to compute all possible W words useful for the SHA-
256 of the second block of the message at each iteration in the loop, with no
need to repeat many arithmetic operations during each iteration. Indeed, since
for each encrypted memory unit, salt, padding and message size are always
the same and hash count is a number between 0 and (0x100000-1), we can
precompute all the W words, that are:
1.048.576 ∗ 64 = 67.108.864 words ∗ 4 byte ' 256Mb
This kind of improvement is specific for BitLocker (precomputation can be
done if there is a part of the input message that is known ahead of time) and
cannot be applied to a general SHA-256 implementation.
In the beginning, we stored pre-computed W words in global memory, but
we found that texture memory (due to the texture caching capabilities) could
11
improve timings (see Section 4). For the first block, we can not precompute
anything, because updateHash changes at every iteration.
Thanks to this improvement we reduced the CUDA registers pressure and
usage, being able to use 64 registers for each CUDA thread and then 1024
threads for each CUDA block (about 100% occupancy). We measure a perfor-
mance enhancement, reaching up to 340 passwords per second.
3.4. Second improvement: MAC comparison
During our analysis of the decrypted VMK’s structure, using different Win-
dows versions (7, 8.1 and 10) and a number of encrypted devices, we noticed
several interesting facts:
1. The size of the VMK is always 44 bytes
2. First 12 bytes of decrypted VMK (Table 2) hold information about the
key
• First 2 bytes are the size of VMK, that is always 44 (0x002c)
• Bytes 4 and 5 are the version number, always equal to 1
• Byte 8 and 9 are the type of encryption. In case of user password,
BitLocker always uses AES-CCM with a 256 bit key. So, according
to the Microsoft standard, this value is between 0x2000 and 0x2005
3. Remaining 32 bytes are the key
Byte 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Value 2c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 03 20 00 00
Table 2: Example of initial 12 bytes of VMK decryption key
Following those considerations, we removed the MAC test doing a simple
check on the initial 12 bytes of the decrypted VMK, as shown in Figure 6.
On our GPU Tesla K80 performance reached 385 passwords per second (see
Section 4 for further details).
To check the reliability of our solution, we tested BitCracker with several
storage devices (both internal and USB-connected hard disks) encrypted by us-
ing passwords having between 8 and 16 characters under Windows 7 Enterprise
Edition, Windows 7 Ultimate Edition and Windows 8 Pro N and Windows 10
Enterprise Edition (testing both BitLocker’s compatible and non compatible
modes) 8.
Although BitCracker always returned the correct output, some false posi-
tive may occur with this improved VMK check; for this reason BitCracker can
be executed in 2 different modes: with (slower solution) or without (faster so-
lution) the MAC comparison .
8Recently Microsoft introduced the BitLocker ”Not Compatible” encryption mode in
Windows 10: sectors of the memory device are encrypted with XTS-AES instead of AES-
CCM. This change doesn’t affect BitCracker algorithm because there isn’t any difference in
the decryption procedure of the VMK.
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3.5. Final Architecture
We implemented the final solution, shown in Algorithm 2, using CUDA and
OpenCL doing an extensive performance analysis in Sections 4 and 5.
As described in Section 2.1, the main SHA-256 loop produces the interme-
diate key, that must be used as an AES key to encrypt the IV in order to
decrypt the VMK. We have implemented our own AES version customized for
GPU environment [11], used in line 15 of Algorithm 2. In Figure 7 we represent
the entire BitCracker’s general procedure outside of the GPU kernels.
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not empty
Encrypted
Memory Device
Image
Dictionary
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Passwords
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GPU Valid VMK
format?
Correct
password
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Figure 7: BitCracker general algorithm
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Algorithm 2 BitCracker Kernel
1: function BitCrackerKernel(password, WTextureWords, IV, VMK)
2: hash = Sha256SingleExec(Sha256SingleExec(password));
3: for i = 1 to 0x100000 do
4: SetStartValue(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
5: . /* SHA-256 on the first message block */
6: Compute first 32 W words, depending on hashi−i
7: Exec first 32 rounds
8: Compute second 32 W words
9: Exec second 32 rounds
10: Update hashi value
11: . /* SHA-256 on the second message block */
12: Exec 64 rounds, reading W blocks from WTextureWords
13: Update hashi value
14: end for
15: Crypt IV with final hash value as key of AES
16: VMKDecrypted = XOR(IVCrypted, VMK)
17: if checkVMK(VMKDecrypted) then
18: return true;
19: end if
20: end function
4. CUDA implementation performance
In this Section we present the results of benchmarking activities of our
stand-alone CUDA implementation of BitCracker with the improvements de-
scribed in previous sections. We used several NVIDIA GPUs whose features
are summarized in Table 3 9.
Acronim Name Arch CC # SM SM Clock CUDA
GFT GeForce Titan Kepler 3.5 14 836 MHz 7.0
GTK80 Tesla K80 Kepler 3.5 13 875 MHz 7.0/7.5
GFTX GeForce Titan X Maxwell 5.2 24 1001 MHz 7.5
GTP100 Tesla P100 Pascal 6.1 56 1189 MHz 8.0
GTV100 Tesla V100 Volta 7.0 80 1290 MHz 9.0
Table 3: NVIDIA GPUs used for bench
During the following tests we always set the number of CUDA blocks to the
maximum number of SM allowed by the GPU architecture: further increasing
this number does not improve performance. The number of CUDA threads per
block is always 1024 because each thread requires no more than 64 registers
(we reached the maximum occupancy).
9CC is Compute Capability while SM is Stream Multiprocessors
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4.1. Kepler Architecture
We started to benchmark our final improved solution on the Kepler archi-
tecture using GPUs GTK80 (Table 4) and GFT (Table 5).
Blocks Threads/Block Pwds/Thread Pwds/Kernel Seconds Pwds/Sec
1 1.024 1 1.024 30 33
1 1.024 8 8.192 245 33
2 1.024 8 16.384 247 66
4 1.024 8 32.768 248 132
8 1.024 8 65.536 253 258
13 1.024 8 106.496 276 385
Table 4: GTK80 benchmarks
Blocks Threads/Block Pwds/Thread Pwds/Kernel Seconds Pwds/Sec
1 1.024 1 1.024 39 25
1 1.024 8 8.192 318 25
14 1.024 8 114.688 364 314
Table 5: GFT benchmarks
The more the input grows, the better BitCracker performs. Increasing the
number of blocks, each one with the same number of passwords per thread (i.e.,
8), leads to a better performance since the kernel launching overhead (that is
basically constant) is distributed among more blocks.
The GTK80 appears to be faster with respect to the GTF. For instance,
in the 8 passwords per thread last test-case the GTK80 is able to check ∼ 70
more passwords per second than the GFT even if it has one less multiproces-
sor. To shed some light on this difference, we report in Table 6 a summary
of instructions types and occurrences in one out of 0x100000 iterations of the
SHA-256 loop.
Instruction Throughput GTK80 Throughput GTF # Occurrence
32-bit integer add 160 160 1.121
32-bit integer shift 64 32 2.016
32-bit bitwise 160 160 1.600
Table 6: Instructions throughput
As described in the NVIDIA developer zone 10:
• to maximize instruction throughput, the application should minimize the
use of arithmetic instructions with low throughput;
• throughput is given in number of operations per clock cycle per multi-
processor. For a warp size of 32, one instruction corresponds to 32 opera-
10NVIDIA Developer Zone: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc162804.aspx
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tions, so if N is the number of operations per clock cycle, the instruction
throughput is N/32 instructions per clock cycle.
Since the 32-bit integer shift is the most used instruction (due to the circular
shift, see Section 3) the fact that its throughput in the GTK80 is twice than
in the GFT could explain the significant difference in performance. Due to
the relevance of the shift instruction, the circular shift is translated inside the
PTX code in a funnel shift operation (faster than regular shift) even if this is
not explicitly specified in the CUDA code. That is, an instruction like:
((x) << 26) | ((x) >> 6))
becomes, in PTX code:
shf.l.wrap.b32 %r8165, %r8152, %r8152, 26
We limit the number of registers for a single thread to 64. This choice
makes it possible to have 1.024 threads for each block since each Stream Mul-
tiprocessor for Kepler and Maxwell GPU has 65536 32-bit registers. On the
GTK80 there is no memory spilling while on the GFT we have just 24 bytes of
memory spilling (handled by the L1 cache). Nevertheless, this configuration of-
fers the best performance. The occupancy level is close to 100% provided that
there are enough passwords in input (shared memory is not a limiting factor
since we do not use it).
In Table 7 we report some of the metrics provided by the CUDA profiler
nvprof running a synthetic test in which the number of loop iterations is lim-
ited to 65.536 to prevent the overflow of some counters that occurred in the
full 0x100000 iterations execution:
Instructions issued 8.072.134.346
Instruction replay overhead 0,000003
Global memory load 2.208
Global memory store trans. 1
Local memory load trans. 0
Local memory store trans. 0
Arithmetic Function Unit Utilization High(9)
Texture cache hit rate 99.80%
Table 7: nvprof Metrics on GTK80
The number of instructions issued is greater than the number of global mem-
ory transactions, so BitCracker can be considered, somehow, instructions lim-
ited (this is not surprising since there are very few global memory load/store
operations). The metrics about the texture cache confirms that the use of tex-
ture memory for W words (instead of global memory) is optimal. There is
no instruction serialization inside a single warp (usually serialization is due to
memory conflicts) because instruction replay overhead metrics is very close to
0. Finally, there are no local memory transactions due to our optimization
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work described in Section 3.2.
4.2. Maxwell Architecture
In Table 8 we present the same benchmarks of the previous Section executed
on the GFTX, using CC3.5 and CC5.2 (both available on the GPU).
CC Blocks Threads/Block Pwds/Thread Pwds/Kernel Seconds Pwds/Sec
3.5 1 1.024 1 1.024 24 42
3.5 1 1.024 8 8.192 191 42
3.5 24 1.024 8 196.608 212 925
3.5 24 1.024 128 3.145.728 3496 900
5.2 1 1.024 1 1.024 23 44
5.2 1 1.024 8 8.192 188 43
5.2 24 1.024 8 196.608 210 933
5.2 24 1.024 128 3.145.728 3369 933
Table 8: GFTX benchmarks, CC3.5 and CC5.2
It is worth to note that performance improves both due to the higher num-
ber of multiprocessors available in the new generation of NVIDIA cards and
for the enhancements in integer instructions throughput 11. This confirms that
a well-tuned CUDA code can benefit from new features with a very limited
effort.
With CUDA 7.5 NVIDIA released new PTX instructions like IADD3 and
LOP3, that support a range of 3-operand logic operations, such as (A&B&C),
(A&B&¬C), (A&B ∨C) and so on. According to the release notes in 12, those
instructions are fully supported on GPUs with CC 5.0 or greater, while on a
Kepler architecture they are simulated; therefore we optimized BitCracker code
for Maxwell cards.
In other words, the LOP3 instruction combines three operands according
to a Truth Table expressed as a hexadecimal number; in Table 9 there is an
example of a XOR Truth Table. See 13 for further details and examples.
11NVIDIA Developer Zone Maxwell: https://developer.nvidia.com/maxwell-compute-
architecture
12NVIDIA Devblog: https://devblogs.nvidia.com/parallelforall/new-features-cuda-7-5
13NVIDIA PTX LOP3: http://docs.nvidia.com/cuda/parallel-thread-execution/# logic-
and-shift-instructions-lop3
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a b c result
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
0x96
Table 9: XOR Truth Table
Looking at Table 8, Maxwell card performance increases when using 5.2
compute capability with an intensive use of the above mentioned PTX instruc-
tions for all the bitwise boolean operations involved in the SHA-256 algorithm
described in 3.2.
4.3. Pascal architecture
In Table 10, we summarize our benchmarks on GTP100. The performance
improvement is close to a × 2 factor with respect to the Maxwell architecture
even if the main advantage of the new architecture (i.e., the memory band-
width that is about three times higher with respect to the Kepler architecture)
has limited impact on a compute-intensive application like BitCracker.
CC Blocks Threads/Block Pwds/Thread Pwds/Kernel Seconds Pwds/Sec
6.1 1 1.024 1 1.024 38 26
6.1 56 1.024 1 57.344 40 1.418
6.1 56 1.024 8 458.752 336 1.363
6.1 56 1.024 128 7.340.032 5444 1.348
Table 10: GTP100 benchmark
4.4. Volta architecture
In Table 11, we summarize our benchmarks on GTV100. The performance
improvement is more than × 2 factor with respect to the Pascal architecture.
CC Blocks Threads/Block Pwds/Thread Pwds/Kernel Seconds Pwds/Sec
7.0 1 1.024 1 1.024 24 41
7.0 80 1.024 1 81.920 25 3.252
7.0 80 1.024 8 655.360 210 3.107
Table 11: GTV100 benchmark
5. OpenCL Implementation
In order to make BitCracker available also to non-NVIDIA GPUs, we de-
veloped an OpenCL implementation.
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In Table 12 we report performance of BitCracker-OpenCL standalone ver-
sion tested with an AMD Radeon HD 7990 Malta14, using OpenCL version 1.2
(1800.5), confirming that BitCracker OpenCL is able to run on non-NVIDIA
GPUs.
Work Groups Local Work Group size Pwds/Thread Pwds/Kernel Seconds Pwds/Sec
32 256 1 8.192 41 197
64 256 1 16.384 68 241
32 256 64 524.288 2657 197
64 256 32 524.288 2175 241
64 256 48 786.432 3263 241
Table 12: Benchmarks OpenCL version, AMD Radeon HD 7990 Malta
The results, reported in Table 13, show that the OpenCL implementation is
just 5% slower with respect to the CUDA original implementation on the same
platform (see Table 8).
Work Groups Threads/Block Pwds/Thread Pwds/Kernel Seconds Pwds/Sec
1 1.024 1 1.024 23 44
24 1.024 8 196.608 220 893
24 1.024 128 3.145.728 3555 884
Table 13: GFTX, OpenCL 1.2
6. Performance comparison
It is possible to evaluate BitCracker’s performance by looking at the num-
ber of hashes per second that it computes (we recall that the check of each
password requires 2.097.154 hashes, as described in Section 2.1). The number
of hashes per second that BitCracker is able to perform is summarized in Table
1415 .
GPU Password/Sec Hash/Sec
GFT 303 635 MH/s
GTK80 385 807 MH/s
GFTX 933 1.957 MH/s
GTP100 1.418 2.973 MH/s
GTV100 3.252 6.820 MH/s
Table 14: BitCracker’s hashes per second, CUDA implementation
6.1. Hashcat comparison
To assess BitCracker performance, we carried out a comparison with the
SHA-256 format (-m 1400) Hashcat [7] v4.1.0. We highlight that this is not a
completely fair comparison since Hashcat does not execute exactly the same
14by courtesy of the Openwall HPC Village[13].
15MH stands for MegaHashs
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BitCracker’s algorithm (BitCracker performs other operations beyond SHA-
256) and it currently supports OpenCL only. The test aims at providing an
idea about the number of SHA256 that each one of them is able to compute
per second. We ran a test on the GTV100 using the following parameters:
• -m 1400 : Raw SHA-256 hash format
• -a 3 : Mask attack
• ?a?a?a?a?a?a?a?a?a : Mask to specify passwords of 8 characters
• -d : specify the GTV100 device
• -O and -w 3 as suggested by Hashcat itself to improve performance
The resulting number of hashes per second is 7590 MH/s that is comparable
to BitCracker’s best performance on the same GPU.
6.2. John The Ripper
In order to take advantage of their system of rules for wordlist generation,
our OpenCL implementation has been released as a John the Ripper (Jumbo
version) [8] plugin (format name bitlocker-opencl); the source code can be found
here [9] whereas the wiki reference page is here [10]. When running bitlocker-
opencl format, the John The Ripper internal engine auto-tunes all the OpenCL
parameters (like local and global work groups). Running a simple test like:
./john –format=bitlocker-opencl –wordlist=wordlist.txt hashFile.txt
we reached up to 3150 passwords/second on the GTV100 .
The John The Ripper team developed a CPU format of our attack which
can be invoked using flag “–format=bitlocker”. We reached up to 78 password-
s/second on a CPU Intel(R) Xeon(R) v4, 2.20GHz.
6.3. Performance overview
In Figure 8 we plot the best performance (passwords per second) obtained
testing different GPUs and software frameworks (green bars refer to the CUDA
implementation whereas blue bars refer to the OpenCL implementation).
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Figure 8: BitCracker implementations comparison
7. Conclusions
We presented the first open-source implementation of a tool for efficient dic-
tionary attacks to the BitLocker crypto system.
The results show that our BitCracker may compete with a state-of-the art pass-
word cracker in terms of raw performance on the basic computational kernels
whilst it is the only one providing specific shortcuts to speedup the BitLocker
decryption procedure. We can conclude that, although the complex architec-
ture of BitLocker reduces significatly the number of passwords that is possible
to test in a unit of time, with respect to other crypto-systems (e.g., OpenPGP),
it is still necessary to pay special attention in the choice of the user password
since, with a single high-end GPU, more than a quarter-billion of passwords
can be tested in a day (∼ 3000 passwords per second on a GTV100 × 86400
seconds ' 260 million in a day). Our implementations of SHA-256, fully cus-
tomized for the CUDA-C environment, can be reused (provided that the W
words optimization is turned off, since it cannot be applied to a general situa-
tion) for any procedure that requires to use that hash function (e.g., HMAC-
SHA256).
Other possible improvements include the enhancement of BitCracker by
adding a mask mode attack and/or a smart reading of the input dictionary
(e.g. by assigning a probability to them) that are available in most widely
used password crackers.
We released our CUDA and OpenCL standalone implementations on GitHub
here [14]. In order to take advantage of their system of rules for wordlist gener-
ation, our OpenCL implementation has been released also as a John the Ripper
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(Jumbo version) [8] format. We’re also planning to release BitCracker within
Hashcat.
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